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Between-Session Task: Watch & Write

Tarikat (2021), dir. Jasmijn Schrofer — Aeon Video

Watch: Tarikat (“The Path”) on Aeon Video — free, approximately 15 minutes.
aeon.co/videos/dissolve-into-the-immersive-entrancing-rhythms-of-a-sufi-chant

Then write 400–600 words in response to the prompt below.


The film has no narration, no explanation, no subtitles. It gives you the dhikr as a sensory event — sound, movement, breath, proximity, faces — without telling you what to think about it.

Stjernholm writes about attending exactly this kind of gathering in North London — and notes that despite not participating, he developed “a certain sensorium for distinguishing between what he perceived to be good and lesser forms of dhikr”. He also describes how the dhikr produced in him “a sense of heightened awareness of the here and now” — and then asks, carefully, what it means that a non-participant can be affected by a practice that isn’t theirs.

Watch the film as that kind of non-participant. Then write about one specific moment — a sound, a face, a movement, a cut — where something happened in your body or attention that you didn’t expect or didn’t choose. Not what the film means. What it did.

Then bring Stjernholm to bear: was what happened to you sensory knowledge — or something else? Does his framework give you the words for it, or does it fall short?

Don’t describe the film generally or summarise what dhikr is. Start from the specific moment. The more precise you are about what you actually experienced, the more useful the writing will be in thinking about different aspects of “sensing” spirituality and religion.

sound and contamination, or the private and the public

Let us begin with a scene. A gathering in Amsterdam — liberals, academics, people who consider themselves thoughtful about religion in the public sphere. Among them, Fouad Laroui: a Moroccan-Dutch novelist and academic, Muslim by background, secular by conviction, someone who has spent his career thinking seriously about the position of Islam in European modernity. And Laroui says, more or less: please keep it to yourself, and the world will become a better place.

He is — among other things — talking about the azan. His position is not that Islam is wrong, or that Muslims do not have rights, or that Europe should close its borders. His position is the position of a secular intellectual who happens to have Muslim heritage: religion is a private matter, it belongs behind the door of the mosque and the home, and broadcasting it into shared urban space is an imposition on people who did not ask to receive it. This is a coherent, considered, non-hysterical position. And it rests on a very specific — and contestable — understanding of what secularism is.

Here we must introduce a distinction that Pooyan Tamimi Arab develops in his study of the azan in the Netherlands, a distinction that, once grasped, makes a great many confusions dissolve. There are, he argues, two entirely different things that go by the name of secularism. The first is constitutional secularism: the legal-institutional framework that separates church and state, protects freedom of religion equally, and prohibits the state from privileging one religion’s sounds over another’s. Under constitutional secularism, the azan has exactly the same rights as church bells. The law in the Netherlands is clear on this. It is settled. The azan is protected.

The second is cultural secularism: the ambient assumption — not legislated, not enforced by any statute, but socially enforced with considerable force — that public space should be neutral, which is to say free of explicit religious presence. This is the secularism Laroui is invoking. And the problem with it — the problem that Tamimi Arab’s entire book is dedicated to making visible — is that it is not neutral. It never was. What it calls neutrality is a particular religious settlement that arrived first and then declared itself the absence of religion.

Let us be more dedicated here. Cultural secularism in Northern Europe is Protestant in shape. This is not an insult but a historical observation. The Reformation produced a particular understanding of what religion is: interior, personal, a matter of individual conscience, fundamentally private. You believe in your heart, you practice in your church, you keep it out of the street. This understanding was generalised — first across European Christian denominations, then presented as the universal definition of what a properly “modern” religion does. Privatise. Interiorise. Disappear from public life except on designated occasions in designated buildings.

But let us be more precise about which cities we are talking about, because the argument looks different depending on where you stand. The “cultural secularism is Protestant” claim is strongest in places where Protestantism is still a living cultural force — rural Germany, Scandinavia, the Netherlands of fifty years ago. In Amsterdam today, the churches whose bells ring every fifteen minutes serve congregations that represent a small fraction of the population. The Christmas market is attended by people who are Christian in the way that someone born in Paris is “culturally French” — a nominal identity that organises the calendar without organising the life. What we are really describing, in many Western European cities, is not Protestantism but its ghost: a settlement from which the religious content has been substantially drained, leaving the forms in place and calling them secular. This changes the argument slightly. The church bell that rings in a post-Christian city is almost nobody’s active religious practice. But it is still not the azan. And the azan is still marked as someone’s — still arrives as religious, still refuses the amnesia that the bell achieved precisely by becoming nobody’s in particular.

Christianity, in most of Northern Europe, has done this privatisation and interiorisation. Or rather — and this is the crucial point — it has appeared to do this. The church bells still ring. The calendar is organised around Christian holidays. The crosses remain in German and Italian public school classrooms. The Christmas market occupies the city center. But these residues of Christian religious presence have been reclassified. They are not religion anymore. They are culture, tradition, heritage, the texture of European civilisation. They have achieved what might be called historical amnesia: they are so thoroughly embedded in what “European public space” means that they have ceased to appear as religious at all.

The azan cannot achieve this amnesia (maybe yet, one might say). It arrived after the reclassification was complete. It will, at least for now, always appear as religious — which is to say, as an imposition on a neutrality that was already, invisibly, full.

And yet — we need to question the function and meaning of the azan as well. The amplified broadcast of the azan through loudspeakers is not simply “Islamic tradition.” It is a twentieth-century intervention, dependent on technology the tradition could not have anticipated, and one that is actively contested within Islamic jurisprudence itself. The traditional azan was a human voice from a human throat, acoustically calibrated for the urban fabric it inhabited — the minaret was engineered so that the voice would carry to the edge of the mosque’s community without mechanical amplification. The loudspeaker changes this fundamentally, and not without controversy. Several Muslim-majority countries regulate azan amplification far more strictly than European constitutional law requires. Egypt under al-Sisi standardised and centralised the broadcast across thousands of mosques, eliminating individual muezzins and their variations in the name of order and consistency. When we talk about the right to broadcast the azan in European cities, we are talking about a practice whose specific modern form is itself a construction — the tradition is old, but this version of it is not.

Nor do all Muslims want it — and this is the fact that the Islam-versus-European-secularism framing most aggressively suppresses. Within European Muslim communities, which are internally diverse in ways the public debate almost never acknowledges, there are serious disagreements about whether amplified broadcast is the “right” form of Islamic public presence in a non-Muslim majority context: whether it serves the community or primarily signals its existence to those outside it, whether the political energy spent defending it might be better spent elsewhere, whether it is even what the tradition requires in this specific historical situation. Treating the azan debate as a clean confrontation between Islamic tradition and European cultural secularism is a convenience for both sides. It simplifies what is, from within Islam, a considerably more open question — and it does so in a way that, ironically, mirrors the very move Tamimi Arab is criticising: flattening a diverse practice into a single, unified object that can then be defended or attacked wholesale.

On another note: The Swiss referendum of 2009 banned the construction of new minarets — note: not the azan, not Islamic worship, not even the sound of anything. The minaret itself. A tower. Silent architecture. Fifty-seven percent of Swiss voters found that the mere visual presence of Islamic vertical form in their cities was unacceptable. The minarets were not broadcasting anything. They were simply there. Constitutional secularism found the ban extremely difficult to defend, since it violated religious freedom in the most elementary sense. Cultural secularism found it completely natural. Presence, not sound, was the issue.

And yet the Swiss case opens a further complication, one that cuts in a different direction. A critic writing in the German tabloid Bild — in the context of the Cologne azan decision — argued that the church bell comparison does not hold, and not for the reasons one might expect. His argument: the church bell is a signal without words. It marks time, calls people to something, punctuates the urban day — but it asserts nothing. The azan, by contrast, makes a propositional claim. Allahu akbar. God is great. Muhammad is his prophet. It is not merely sound but statement, broadcast into public space where people of all convictions, or none, must receive it whether they wish to or not. One can dismiss this argument — and the source it comes from — as bad faith dressed in philosophical clothing. But it is not an incoherent argument. A genuinely secular public space, the position suggests, is not one that treats all religious sounds equally; it is one that does not broadcast propositional religious claims at all. The question is whether this distinction between signal and statement holds up — or whether it collapses the moment you notice that nobody in Amsterdam knows the words of the Kyrie Eleison the church organ is playing, and that a statement nobody can hear as a statement functions, in practice, as a signal anyway.

One might object: but the Swiss referendum is an extreme case, not representative of mainstream European attitudes toward the azan. True. But consider the proposals made in several Dutch municipalities when mosques applied for permission to broadcast the call to prayer. The suggestion, offered in good faith by people who considered themselves sympathetic: replace the azan with light signals. LED pulses from the minaret, timed to correspond to the prayer calls, visible to the local Muslim community. The religious function preserved. The sound removed. Islamic practice permitted, on condition that it becomes inaudible.

This is cultural secularism arriving at its logical conclusion. The only version of Islamic public presence it can tolerate is one that has been rendered almost invisible — which is to say, the only acceptable Islam is an Islam that has learned to perform the disappearing act that Protestant Christianity performed several centuries earlier. Such demands are not necessarily for religious equality, but for Islamic assimilation to a Protestant model of what religion is supposed to do with itself.

Which brings us back to Laroui, and to what he was asking for. When he says — from within the secular left, as someone with Muslim heritage, as someone whose position cannot simply be dismissed as Islamophobia (although maybe it can? This would be open to discussion) — please keep it to yourself, he is asking for something that sounds like tolerance but is in fact a demand for transformation. He is asking that Islam reorganise itself according to the interior/exterior split that the Reformation produced, and that European Christianity has spent several centuries practicing until it became natural. He is asking that Islam become Protestant, in a way. And he is asking this while standing in a room in Amsterdam where church bells ring every fifteen minutes and nobody in the room has ever called that a problem.

There is a historical dimension here that complicates the picture further, without resolving it: The countries making this demand — that Islam remove itself from European public space, privatize, disappear into the interior — are largely the same countries that spent the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ensuring that Islam could not organise its own public space in its own territories. France administered Algeria for 132 years, suppressed Islamic institutions, imposed Catholic spatial and temporal ordering, and in certain periods restricted the azan in the very cities where it had sounded for centuries. Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium did comparable things in comparable ways across the Muslim-majority world. The demand for Islamic privatisation in Paris or Amsterdam is being made by states with an intimate and largely unacknowledged history of dismantling Islamic public life elsewhere.

Tamimi Arab’s response to this — and he was in the room, and he pushed back, not as a Muslim but as someone pointing out an empirical and conceptual impossibility — is not that Laroui is a bad person or a self-hating Muslim. It is something simpler and at the same time more devastating: you cannot produce a neutral public square by demanding that one religion privatise while leaving the prior religious settlement in place and calling it culture. The neutral public square does not exist. There is only the religious arrangement that arrived first, naturalised itself, and then told the newcomers that any visible presence on their part would constitute an imposition on neutrality.

What follows from this? Less than the argument might suggest. Showing that the neutral public square does not exist does not tell us what a non-neutral public square should look like, or whose sounds should be in it, or how communities negotiate presence when every position is already a position. The analysis dissolves a false clarity — the idea that Laroui’s secular demand is simply secular, or that the constitutional protection of the azan is simply about rights — and replaces it with a genuine difficulty. That difficulty has no academic solution. It has only the daily, imperfect, politically charged negotiation of cities that contain more kinds of belonging than their official self-descriptions can accommodate.


Reading that matters here:

Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Amplifying Islam in the European Soundscape (Edinburgh UP, 2017). The constitutional/cultural secularism distinction is the conceptual centre of the book. The Deventer case — where these abstractions become a specific mosque, a specific neighborhood, a specific negotiation — is Chapter 4.

Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford UP, 2003). The longer argument behind Tamimi Arab: how the category of the secular was constructed historically, and why it is not neutral. Dense but essential.

Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization (2006). Two thinkers who disagree about almost everything arguing about what religion’s place in a secular democracy should be. Worth reading as a document of the confusion that Tamimi Arab’s distinction begins to clear up.


Al Jazeera — the clearest and most readable account: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/11/germanys-largest-mosque-to-broadcast-call-to-prayer-on-fridays

VOA News — shorter, good for the basic facts: https://www.voanews.com/a/german-city-of-cologne-allows-mosques-to-broadcast-call-to-prayer-/6266953.html

One detail worth knowing: a critic from Bild argued the church bell comparison doesn’t hold because bells are “a signal without words” whereas the azan says “Allah is great” — which relates to the question about whether the objection is about sound or content.

Switzerland minaret referendum 2009:
Wikipedia — comprehensive, has the full vote breakdown by canton: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Swiss_minaret_referendum

Human Rights Watch statement — useful for the rights argument: https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/04/switzerland-minaret-ban-violates-rights

France24 — good contemporary account with reactions: https://www.france24.com/en/20091130-referendum-voters-support-controversial-ban-minarets

Interesting to know: the Swiss government itself recommended voting against the ban as unconstitutional — and 57.5% voted for it anyway. That’s maybe the clearest possible illustration of the gap between constitutional and cultural secularism.

sensing islam, notes on the session of June 16: azan // dirt

Dear all, unfortunately I have fallen ill after last week, thus to recover from it, unfortunately I won’t make it to campus this week. I had planned to cover the topic of the azan (under the claim statement: “There are no noises at all, only interpreted sounds.”) a bit more, as well as the topic of “dirt” (purity/impurity) and I think we also would have had a student presentation scheduled.

In the meantime, if you come to campus anyway or when you meet with your fellow students, please read pp. 13-15 from Tamimi Arab’s introduction to his book “Amplifying Islam”. From: “In the Netherlands, as in the United States, the right to broadcast the azan is constitutionally protected…” To: “Banning religions from the city, I and others thought, could not be a solution to this predicament.”

Then think about the following:

  1. Laroui (the intellectual against whom Tamimi Arab sort of positions themselves) says religion should stay behind the door. Are they talking about the azan specifically — or about something bigger? What would have to be true about religion for their argument to hold?
  2. The azan is constitutionally protected in the Netherlands. The law is settled. Does that end the question — or does it just move it somewhere the law can’t reach?
  3. Tamimi Arab says the objection to the azan is never really about volume. What is it about? And is that objection legitimate — even if it is also discriminatory?

Later this week, when I’m hopefully healthy again, I will post here on the blog another short task/reading for the topic of “disgust”. For all already interested, it will be from Mary Douglas’ “Purity and Danger”, a book I highly recommend if you are interested in the anthropology of pollution and taboo.

All the best and see you next week.
VM

what the voice was carrying

In 1932, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ordered that the call to prayer be given in Turkish. Every word was translated faithfully. Every theological claim preserved. Every invocation rendered into the vernacular of the people who were supposed to receive it. By any account of what language is for — communication, meaning, the transmission of content from one mind to another — nothing was lost. And yet the response, across Turkey and across the Muslim world, was not that something had been diminished. The response was that something had been destroyed. The Turkish azan was reversed in 1950, under pressure that had nothing to do with electoral politics and everything to do with what it felt like when the sounds were wrong.

This interests me more than most of what I’ve read about religious practice. The assumption embedded in most thinking about religious speech — and I include careful academic thinking, the kind that builds frameworks and cites everything — is that voice is a vehicle. Something is placed inside it: a message, a meaning, a theological claim. The voice travels. The meaning arrives. What the voice is made of — the particular shape of the sounds, the specific phonemes of Arabic rather than Turkish — this is the container, not the contents. You keep the contents and swap the container, and you have performed an act of translation. The Turkish azan was exactly this operation. It failed in a way that the vehicle model cannot explain, and the failure is the thing I keep returning to.

Charles Hirschkind, an anthropologist who spent time in Cairo in the 1990s, was interested in something adjacent: why men who already knew the content of popular religious cassette sermons were listening to the same recordings again and again, on buses, in taxis, walking home. When he went back to the classical Islamic scholarly literature to understand this, he found a developed science of listening — not rhetoric, not the art of speaking, but a detailed practice of receiving sound correctly. How to hold the body while hearing quran. What physical responses — tears, a tightening in the chest, the breath changing — were understood as signs of the heart beginning to turn in the right direction. The tradition’s claim, as Hirschkind reconstructs it, is not that the voice transmits something to you. It is that repeated encounter with the voice makes you into something. The sounds are not a vehicle. They are a technology of the self, which is a phrase Hirschkind borrows from Michel Foucault and which does something strange when placed inside a premodern tradition that arrived at the same idea without Foucault’s help.

This reframe makes the Turkish azan’s failure coherent: the sounds were the practice, not the delivery mechanism for the practice. Replace the sounds and you have not translated the azan; you have ended it. But the reframe also opens something else: If the voice forms the person who hears it — training the body’s responses, making certain interior states available to it over time — then the question of who hears becomes a different kind of question. Pooyan Tamimi Arab, in his study of legal and political fights over the azan in the Netherlands, found that opposition to broadcasting the call to prayer was never actually about volume. The secular city tolerates enormous amounts of noise, think about it: traffic, church bells, concerts, people talking. What it resists is religious sound that crosses the boundary between inside and outside without asking permission. You can choose not to enter a mosque. You cannot choose not to hear the azan if you are in its range. And if the tradition is right about what the sounds do — if the voice does work on the body that receives it, forming and not merely informing — then something is crossing the threshold of the non-Muslim neighbour’s skin without consent. The discomfort is not paranoia. It is, in some sense, theologically accurate.

I find this genuinely difficult to think with, in the way I trust. It is not a difficulty that resolves into tolerance on one side and intolerance on the other, or into religious rights and secular sensibilities trading places across a legal framework. It is a difficulty about what the body is and what crosses its threshold and whether consent is even the right framework for something that happens before the body has had time to decide. The tradition that insists the sounds cannot be replaced is also the tradition that insists the sounds do something to whoever hears them. These two insistences sit together without embarrassment inside Islamic thought, and I’m not sure the secular frameworks we have for adjudicating religious sound in public space have ever really reckoned with the second one.

Which turns out to be the question at the centre of disgust, too — what crosses the threshold of the body uninvited, what the body knows before the mind has been consulted, where exactly you think you end and the world begins.


For next session: Find one thing you find genuinely disgusting. Not hypothetically, not as a thought experiment — something that produces the bodily response, the recoil, the sensation before the thought arrives to name it. Sit with it long enough to ask: what is this disgust protecting? What does it think the boundary of your body is? If you want, write one paragraph, but specific.


Reading that matters here:

Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (Columbia UP, 2006). The argument about formation versus transmission is in Chapter 2; the bodywork of listening is Chapter 4. One of those books that changes what you notice.

Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Amplifying Islam in the European Soundscape (Edinburgh UP, 2017). The azan in the Netherlands as a case study for what happens when a practice designed to cross thresholds meets a secularism that believes religion should stay inside. Directly useful if you live in Europe and have ever had a thought about church bells.

Adriana Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression (Stanford UP, 2005). A philosopher asking what is irreducibly particular about a voice — what is lost when voice is reduced to the content it carries. Counterpoint to everything the standardisation of Quranic recitation demands, and worth holding against Hirschkind.

the same logic running in both directions

Paul Rozin gave his research subjects a bottle of apple juice and a cockroach. He asked them to dip the cockroach briefly into the juice, remove it, and then drink the juice. They knew the cockroach was sterilised. They knew it was, in any meaningful sense, clean. They refused anyway — and they refused in a way that was not about calculation. They did not weigh the evidence and conclude the juice was unsafe. Something older than reasoning said no.

He then reversed the experiment. He asked subjects to handle an object that had belonged to someone they admired — a celebrity, a historical figure, a person they loved. Most people were slightly more willing to touch food that had touched the admired object than food that had not. The direction reversed. The mechanism was the same.

Rozin called this the law of contagion. Once two things have been in contact, properties transfer between them — permanently, irreversibly, regardless of what the rational mind knows about sterilisation or the impossibility of holiness residing in material objects. The law runs in both directions. Contamination flows from the disgusting thing outward. Sanctity flows from the sacred thing outward. What the disgusting thing and the sacred thing share is not content but structure: they both transmit, they both mark what they touch, they both cannot be neutralised by knowledge.

What I kept turning over after the last session was the implication that nobody said directly: if the law of contagion is the mechanism of both pollution and sanctity, then the tradition’s most careful regulations and its most transgressive acts are doing the same thing. The quran cannot be touched without ritual purification — the purity requirement manages the direction of transmission, ensures the body approaches the sacred in the right state rather than contaminating it. The companion who drank the prophet’s blood was doing the same thing from the other side: letting the sacred flow into the body through the most complete possible contact. The regulation and the transgression are not opposites. They are the same logic, applied in different directions.

This should be more unsettling than it usually sounds when stated. The difference between the careful management of what the body may touch before prayer and the companion’s drinking of the prophet’s blood is not a difference in kind. Both take seriously that touch transmits. Both operate on the understanding that what you contact enters you, or that you enter it. The distance between wudu and the most extreme forms of sacred contact in the companion tradition is a distance of degree, not of logic.

Touch is the sense that refuses metaphor in the way sight accepts it. We say I see what you mean and nobody thinks we are seeing anything. We say I was touched by his words and the body is already involved — the metaphor reaches backward into actual sensation, actual skin. This is what Lakoff and Johnson missed about touch when they catalogued the cognitive defaults of different senses: touch cannot become purely abstract the way vision can. The conceptual metaphor for understanding is visual — clear, opaque, shedding light — because vision operates at a distance and distance is what allows abstraction. Touch requires contact. You cannot understand at a distance the way you can see at a distance. The touching metaphors drag the body back in.

Which may be why the most intimate sacred acts across traditions converge on touch and ingestion rather than on vision. The eucharist is not a vision of the body of christ. It is the body of christ placed on the tongue. The pilgrimage culminates not in seeing the ka’ba but in circling it, reaching toward it, pressing lips to the stone. The sufi initiation is the handclasp — the chain of hands going back to the prophet, each link a physical contact that transmitted something forward. You cannot enter these transmissions from a distance. You have to be touched.

What the session kept circling but never quite reached was the question of whether the abjection in the most extreme cases of sacred touch — the companion drinking blood — is incidental or structural. Whether you push through the disgust to get to the baraka, or whether the disgust is part of what the transmission requires. The law of contagion suggests the latter. What makes blood abject (it crosses the boundary that skin maintains, it moves from inside to outside, it blurs the distinction between self and other) is what makes contact with it maximally potent as transmission. The mechanism requires the crossing. The sacred arrives not despite the breach of the body’s boundary but through it. You cannot be touched by something at a safe distance.

Mary Douglas argued that pollution and the sacred are structurally related — both are set apart, both are dangerous, both require careful handling, both can contaminate. The tradition that regulates touch most precisely is the tradition that has understood this most clearly: that the same sense that can transmit the sacred can transmit its opposite, that the circuit runs in both directions, that there is no neutral touching.

The worn threshold of a sacred site — stone steps gone concave from centuries of feet — sits at the edge of all of this without resolving it. What is in those steps? The accumulated touch of every body that crossed them. The trace of contact so repeated that it changed the material. This is the law of contagion made geological, made slow, made visible in stone. Something passed. It cannot be said what. The step is smooth.


Before our next session: think about a piece of music, a voice, or a sound that has done something to your body that you did not authorise. Not music you chose because you knew it would move you — something that arrived and changed the body before you decided anything about it. Come ready to describe what happened physically, not what it meant.

References:

Rozin, Paul, Jonathan Haidt, and Clark McCauley. “Disgust.” In Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette Haviland-Jones. Guilford Press, 2000.

Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. Routledge, 1966.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press, 1980.

On the companion tradition: Ibn Sa’d, Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir; Suyuti, al-Khasa’is al-Kubra.

sensing: sight — a task for before we next meet

I won’t be there this week. Which means the session happens without me, and I want it to happen — not as a gap in the course but as something you do together that we then bring into the room when we’re back.

Here is what I’ve been thinking about, and what I want you to think about too.

We have been reading a book that is saturated with the vocabulary of light and vision. Nur — divine light. Hidaya — guidance, which is always described as light. The beatific vision — ru’yat allah — promised as the highest reward of paradise. The qalb, the heart, which replaces the physical eye because the physical eye cannot see god. Kashf — mystical unveiling. Ishraq — illumination, the dawning light of divine knowledge. Kufr — disbelief, whose arabic root means to cover, to conceal, to make dark. Islamic theology reaches for light and sight almost compulsively when it needs to describe the sacred. So does christian theology. So does buddhist. So does hindu. The halo appears around every sacred figure in every tradition that makes images of the sacred. Enlightenment is a light-word in every language that has the concept.

And yet.

I want you to think about what the body is actually doing in the practices we have been reading about. Salat: the eyes are cast downward toward the place of prostration. During prostration itself, they look at the nose. The gaze during prayer is regulated, directed at the floor — not at anything sacred, not at the source of light the theology is always reaching toward. Dhikr: rhythmic collective repetition, often with eyes closed or unfocused. The goal is wajd — a state of ecstatic finding — and the visual field is typically reduced or eliminated to get there. Quran recitation: the quran is primarily a sonic text. It was revealed as sound, transmitted as sound, memorised as sound. The written quran is but a record of a recitation, not the primary form. Fasting: the systematic withdrawal of taste for an entire month. Hajj: the body walking, running, pressing through crowds, touching stone, drinking water. The call to prayer: heard before anything is seen.

Something is going on there. The theology and the vocabulary say sight. The body does something else.


Before we next meet, I want you to do three things.

First. Take the list I just gave you — of practices where the body is not primarily seeing — and try to add to it from the book. Where else in Stjernholm’s account is the body doing something non-visual that the language around it reaches for visual metaphor anyway? Try to think of other spiritual practices beyond islam as well.

Second. Here is a verse. Read it in at least two of these translations.

Arabic: اَللّٰهُ نُوْرُ السَّمٰوٰتِ وَالْاَرْضِ ۗ مَثَلُ نُوْرِهٖ كَمِشْكٰوةٍ فِيْهَا مِصْبَاحٌ ۗ اَلْمِصْبَاحُ فِيْ زُجَاجَةٍ ۗ اَلزُّجَاجَةُ كَاَنَّهَا كَوْكَبٌ دُرِّيٌّ يُّوْقَدُ مِنْ شَجَرَةٍ مُّبٰرَكَةٍ زَيْتُوْنَةٍ لَّا شَرْقِيَّةٍ وَّلَا غَرْبِيَّةٍ يَّكَادُ زَيْتُهَا يُضِيْۤءُ وَلَوْ لَمْ تَمْسَسْهُ نَارٌ ۗ نُوْرٌ عَلٰى نُوْرٍ

Arberry (1955): God is the Light of the heavens and the earth; the likeness of His Light is as a niche wherein is a lamp — the lamp in a glass, the glass as it were a glittering star — kindled from a Blessed Tree, an olive that is neither of the East nor of the West whose oil wellnigh would shine, even if no fire touched it; Light upon Light.

Asad (1980): God is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The parable of His light is, as it were, that of a niche containing a lamp; the lamp is enclosed in glass, the glass shining like a radiant star: a lamp lit from a blessed tree — an olive-tree that is neither of the east nor of the west — the oil whereof would well-nigh give light of itself even though fire had not touched it: light upon light.

Paret (1962): Gott ist das Licht der Himmel und der Erde. Sein Licht ist — man kann es vergleichen — wie eine Nische, in der sich eine Lampe befindet. Die Lampe ist in einem Glas. Das Glas ist, als wäre es ein funkelnder Stern. Sie wird angezündet von einem gesegneten Baum, einem Ölbaum, der weder östlich noch westlich ist. Sein Öl würde von selbst leuchten, auch wenn kein Feuer es berührt hätte. Licht über Licht.

Bobzin (2010): Gott ist das Licht der Himmel und der Erde. Das Gleichnis seines Lichtes ist das einer Nische, in der eine Lampe ist. Die Lampe ist in einem Glas. Das Glas ist gleichsam ein strahlender Stern. Sie wird angezündet von einem gesegneten Baum, einem Ölbaum, weder östlich noch westlich. Sein Öl würde fast leuchten, auch wenn kein Feuer es berührte. Licht auf Licht.

Notice what changes across the translations. Arberry says “the likeness of His Light.” Asad says “the parable.” Paret adds “man kann es vergleichen” — one can compare it — a hedge that is not in the Arabic at all. Bobzin uses “Gleichnis” — parable, allegory, narrative distance. The arabic says god IS light, directly, without qualification. Then it immediately builds a comparison. The translators pull back from the directness in different ways.

The question I want you to sit with: the verse identifies god directly as light, then immediately constructs an elaborate visual apparatus to approach that identification — niche, lamp, glass, oil, tree, fire. The oil burns without fire. The tree is neither east nor west. These are impossible objects. Why does the verse build its comparison from things that cannot exist?

Third. Pay attention this week to how often sight and light appear in ordinary speech — not religious contexts, just everyday conversation — when someone means they understand something, or don’t. Write down five or six phrases you actually hear or use. Don’t go looking for them. Just notice.


Bring your thoughts on all three to the next session. We will start there before we move on to touch.

One question to carry with you: when you say something like “I see what you mean” — are you seeing anything?

I won’t be on campus // May 26

Dear all,
unfortunately due to my train being delayed, I won’t be able to be on campus on time for today’s session. However, this doesn’t mean that thinking about today’s topic cannot happen. My idea was for today’s session to talk about senses in general and speci
fically sight and whether or not it is the most important sense in religion.

When you come to campus and find other students there, discuss this:

How many senses are there? List them.
For each sense you found — give one or two specific examples of that sense at work in religious or spiritual practice. Be concrete. Not ‘prayer involves hearing’ — what exactly, in which practice, with which sense.
When you have enough, sort these examples into two columns. On one side: what the tradition TALKS about and WRITES about — the vocabulary, the theology, the imagery. On the other side: what the body is actually DOING in practice. Do any senses dominate so
mewhere?

And, if you have more time, read the verse of light from the qur’an in different languages and discuss how it connects to the topic of “senses”.

See you next week.
Victoria

the body that doesn’t ask permission

Something stayed with me from the session that I want to think through here, because I don’t think we got all the way to the bottom of it.

We arrived at a distinction — trained body versus involuntary body — and found that it wouldn’t hold. The involuntary response turns out to be partly the product of training; the trained response turns out to produce something that feels genuinely involuntary, genuinely arrived-from-outside. Al-Ghazali says: if the tears don’t come, reach for them, and at some point the reaching and the tears become indistinguishable. William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling (2001), says: saying “I am moved” participates in the movement. The boundary between what you did and what happened to you is not where you thought it was.

But I want to push at something the session didn’t quite reach. We kept asking whether the involuntary response is more or less authentic than the trained one. And underneath that question is an assumption I’m not sure we examined: that authenticity is the right criterion. That the thing we should be asking about a religious sensory experience is whether it is genuine — whether it really happened, whether it was really God rather than the apparatus, whether the feeling was the person’s own rather than produced by the community’s instruction manual for correct feeling.

Where does that criterion come from? It comes, I think, from exactly the Protestant interior turn that Talal Asad is tracing. The question “was it genuine” is a question about the inner state of the individual — whether the belief was really there, whether the intention was pure, whether the self was authentically engaged. It is a deeply individualist question, and a deeply suspicious one. It assumes that experience needs to be checked against something — against sincerity, against doctrinal correctness, against some standard of authenticity that exists prior to and independent of the experience itself. And that assumption is not Islamic in origin. Or not only Islamic. It arrived in the study of religion through a particular intellectual history that decided the interior was where the real thing happened.

The idea of qalb (arab. “heart”) complicates this in a way I find genuinely disorienting. The heart as perceptual organ — an organ that can be polished or corroded, trained to perceive more finely or allowed to rust shut — is not an apparatus for producing authentic inner states. It is a faculty for perceiving something real. The question is not “did you really feel it” but “could you see it.” Which means the relevant criterion shifts from authenticity to acuity. The question is less whether your experience was genuine and more whether your perceptual organ was calibrated correctly. And that is a completely different kind of question with completely different implications for what religious practice is supposed to do.

A polished mirror reflects accurately. A corroded mirror distorts. The mirror doesn’t decide whether it’s being authentic — it either shows what is there or it doesn’t. The Sufi understanding of the heart is closer to this than to anything like Protestant sincerity. Which means the trained body, in this framework, is not the body that has been conditioned to produce correct feelings on cue. It is the body that has been prepared to perceive accurately. Training is calibration, not conditioning. And this distinction matters.

And yet — here is where I get stuck, and I want to stay stuck rather than moving past it — calibration implies an object. Calibration implies there is something there to be perceived accurately or inaccurately. The polished mirror reflects what is in front of it. What is in front of the qalb? This is not a question that can be answered by methodology. It is a question the whole framework of sensory religious experience opens without being able to close. Tanya Luhrmann, How God Becomes Real (2020), can tell you how people train themselves to experience divine presence. She cannot tell you whether what they experience is a presence or a trained capacity for experiencing presence. And that gap — between the training and its object — is where every account of religious sensory experience lives.

I want to approach the next session from a different angle. We have been talking about the body that responds — to sound, to rhythm, to collective breathing, to the voice that does something before you’ve authorized it. But we have barely touched the sense that Western religious art, architecture, and theology have treated as the most spiritual of all: sight. The great cathedrals are machines for producing particular qualities of light. The mosque lamp is engineered to diffuse illumination in a specific way. Enlightenment — in every tradition that uses the word — is visual. The beatific vision. The light of guidance. Nur Muhammad, the light of the Prophet that precedes creation. We see the sacred. Or we say we do.

But why? Why should sight be the sense that reaches God when smell enters the brain more directly, bypassing the cognitive apparatus entirely? When touch is the most intimate sense, the one that requires actual proximity, actual contact? When the body praying is oriented not toward a visual image but toward a direction — the qibla — which you cannot see at all?

Someone decided that sight was the spiritual sense. That decision has a history. And the history is not obvious.


Before our next session: find one example — from any tradition, any context, religious or not — where sight is treated as the sense that accesses truth. Then find one example where another sense does that work instead. Bring both, and bring one sentence about what is at stake in the difference.


If the session raised questions you want to follow further, two short texts are worth reading alongside it. Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion — the passage that begins “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations” — is in “Religion as a Cultural System” (1966), widely available, about 40 pages. Read it specifically asking: where is the body? What does this definition assume about the relationship between symbol and sensation? Asad’s critique in the first chapter of Genealogies of Religion will make more sense once you have Geertz’s own words in hand rather than Asad’s paraphrase of them.

On emotives: William Reddy’s concept is developed in The Navigation of Feeling (2001), but the clearest short version is in his essay “Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions” (1997) in Current Anthropology, freely available online. The key passage is where he distinguishes constative speech acts from emotives — the moment he shows that saying “I am angry” is not a description but an act that participates in producing or modifying the state it names. Read it asking: if religious speech acts function as emotives, what does that mean for the niyya question? Does the intention precede the speech, or does the speech produce the intention?

what we name vs. what we don’t name

Something happened in the first session that I didn’t fully anticipate, and I want to try to say what it was.

We started with the practice descriptions — the 200-word accounts of things people do regularly, in sequence, that produce a reliable state. A morning run in a specific order. Coffee made with deliberate resistance. An evening ritual involving particular music at a particular volume. Small, precise, unnamed. And then we built two columns on the board: named on one side, unnamed on the other. The named column filled up with things that have communities behind them, instructions, criteria for doing them wrong. The unnamed column was full of solitary choreographies that belong only to the person who does them.

named, e.g. ibada? social?unnamed, e.g. ada? individual?
“Sitzplatz”
Waldbaden
self-care?
uniforms?
costumes?
drinking hot chocolate
making tea
connecting with nature
birding
dream journal in the morning
skin care routine
getting dressed
smoking a cigarette after dinner
sport before breakfast

What struck me, looking at the board, was how the unnamed column wasn’t empty of meaning. It was full of it. Just full of meaning that has no address.

That’s the thing I keep turning over. We tend to assume that naming is additive — that you take a practice and you add a name to it, and now it has more. More weight, more obligation, more recognition. But what if naming is also subtractive? What if the unnamed practice has something — a kind of frictionless intimacy with itself, a freedom from the question of whether you’re doing it correctly — that the name necessarily takes away? The Hanafi position on wudu says: if you washed correctly, you washed correctly, regardless of what was happening in your head. There’s something almost relieving about that. It asks very little of the interior. It says: the act is enough. But it also means someone else has defined what the act consists of. Someone else drew the line around it. The freedom from interior scrutiny comes at the cost of exterior definition.

The niyya debate is fascinating because it refuses to settle. The Shafi’i school insists on the intention preceding the act — without it, the washing is just washing. That seems intuitively right to a lot of people, and I understand why: it preserves the sense that the practice is yours, that you are in it rather than just performing it. But it also creates a permanent anxiety. Did I really intend it? Did I intend it enough? Was I thinking about something else when I started? The interior becomes the site of an endless audit that the exterior form was supposed to resolve.

Ibn ʿArabi adds another layer, which is typically Ibn ʿArabi. He says: between the verses of the Fatiha, God is responding. Some people hear that response with their ears. If you can’t hear it with your ears, hear it with your faith. This is either a beautiful accommodation — an acknowledgment that people sense differently, that the thresholds of perception vary — or it’s a theological trap. Because if faith is sufficient to hear what the ears cannot, then the hearing is unfalsifiable. You can always say you heard it. Which makes the whole edifice of auditory spiritual experience impossible to examine from the outside, including the kind of examination that scholarship tries to do.

We didn’t resolve this. We weren’t supposed to. But the moment that stayed with me came near the end, when someone said: the practices in the unnamed column feel more mine because no one can tell me I’m doing them wrong. And someone else said: but doesn’t that also mean no one can tell you you’re doing them right? The room went quiet for a second in a way that suggested something had landed.

That silence is worth holding onto. Because it points at something Stjernholm’s book, for all its careful taxonomy, doesn’t quite get at: that the desire for a name — for religious community, for validated sensory practice — might partly be a desire for a witness. Not an authority who tells you the form is correct. Something more intimate than that. Someone who can say: yes, what you felt was real, and it was this, and others have felt it too. The unnamed practice is yours alone. It has no one to confirm it.

We’re reading Talal Asad before the next session. I want to give you some orientation for what Asad is doing, because it’s easy to read him as just saying “religion is a Western construction” and stopping there, which would be both reductive and, frankly, a waste of a difficult thinker. What Asad is actually doing is more surgical. He’s asking: where did the category come from that allows us to look at wudu and a morning coffee ritual and say one of these is religious and the other isn’t? Who drew that line, when, and under what political conditions? His answer involves the Reformation, the emergence of the secular state, and the specific need of post-Enlightenment Europe to carve off a domain called religion that could be safely privatized and separated from public reason. Before that carving, the practices we now call Islamic didn’t understand themselves as belonging to a category called religion as opposed to categories called law, ethics, medicine, cosmology, politics. They were all of those things simultaneously. The category “religion” didn’t exist as a container for them. It had to be invented, and it was invented, and then it was applied retrospectively and cross-culturally in ways that had enormous consequences for how Muslim practice got understood — including by Muslims themselves.

So when you read Asad, I want you to hold our two columns in mind. Named and unnamed. Ask: who decided which column was the religious one? And what did that decision require to be invisible?


Before our next session: read Talal Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category” (the first chapter of Genealogies of Religion, 1993, about 25 pages). As you read, do one thing: find the moment in the argument where Asad identifies what gets lost when the category “religion” is applied to practices that didn’t understand themselves that way. Write one sentence about what he says is lost. Bring it.

sensing: task for May 5 (in preperation of May 12)

Before our next meeting on May 12, I want you to do one thing.

Find a practice you do regularly that produces a reliable feeling in you. Not a religious practice — or not an obviously religious one. Something you do in a particular order, in a particular way, that reliably produces a particular state. It could be small and mundane. It probably is.

Describe it precisely. What do you do, in what sequence, what does the body do while you do it, and what arrives when it works. Write no more than 200 words. Do not explain why you think it works. Do not theorize about it. Just describe it, as exactly as you can, as if you were describing it to someone who has never seen you.

For example: every morning I grind coffee by hand, feeling the resistance change as the beans break down. I load the grounds into the ROK, press the portafilter in, raise the arms — and then I press down slowly, the whole weight of my hands against the resistance of the water forcing through the coffee, about 25 seconds to one minute. While the espresso runs I heat the raw cocoa with the Aeroccino, which froths it into something almost thick. The two go together into one cup. What arrives is not exactly wakefulness and not exactly calm. I don’t have a better word for it than: readiness. The sequence has to happen in this order. If I skip the grinding or rush the pressing, something is missing in the result — but also in me...

One restriction: you cannot use meditation, yoga, prayer, or any practice you already think of as spiritual. The point is to find the thing you have never thought of as a practice at all.

Bring it to the session on May 12.